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COMING FULL CIRCLE
n 2010, Rod Lyon of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute wrote: “With the 
return of the more strategically-extroverted Kiwi, it is a good time for Australia 
and New Zealand to be putting more meat on the bones of their Closer Defence 
Relationship�”1 Various areas of the “closer defence relations” between Australia 
and New Zealand are ripe for cooperative enhancement, but one of the most ob-
vious is amphibious operations� Both nations have recognized that their amphibi-
ous forces provide a means to further jointness among national service branches, 
but the current international interest in amphibiosity means they are also a tool 
for effective engagement and for enhancing interoperability�2
Australia and New Zealand are in the unique position of developing their 
own amphibious capabilities concurrently, albeit with major differences in size 
and scope� The process seems particularly apt, given that the Anzac (originally, 
the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) relationship was forged during 
the course of one of the most notorious amphibious operations in history� The 
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has expressly stated: “Since 
fighting side by side as ‘ANZACs’ in the Gallipoli 
campaign of World War I, New Zealand and Aus-
tralian defence forces have forged a close relation-
ship�”3 While it would be easy to dismiss Gallipoli 
as an anachronism—which, in many ways, it is, 
in the context of amphibious operations—the 
reality is that a shared interest in the South Pa-
cific and the close defense ties that Australia and 
I
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New Zealand maintain ensure that cooperation in the area of amphibiosity is 
extremely important�4
Since interoperability is a critical concern for the Australian amphibious force, 
the requirement to operate alongside the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) 
must be considered� As Australia is New Zealand’s closest ally, the former’s de-
velopment of an amphibious force has been a source of great interest to the latter, 
especially given the NZDF’s concurrent development of what was referred to 
originally as the Joint Amphibious Task Force (JATF), but now is known sim-
ply as the Joint Task Force (JTF)� A number of measures have been enacted to 
facilitate the interoperability of the two amphibious forces, but there is room for 
further progress�
This article will consider the utility of amphibious capability in Australia 
and New Zealand’s strategic environment and trace the development of both 
countries’ forces, including the historical influences on Australian Defence Force 
(ADF) and NZDF planning� The achievement of interoperability between the 
ADF and the NZDF, as well as with other likely multinational partners, which has 
been developed through various means, will be assessed� Ultimately, the article 
will contend that, while the ADF and NZDF maintain a relatively high level of 
interoperability, further enhancements in the area of amphibious capability could 
be achieved through greater integration, specifically through emulating the mod-
el adopted by the United Kingdom / Netherlands Amphibious Force (UKNLAF)�
THE REQUIREMENT FOR AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY:  
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
The Australian government has established that the nation’s primary operating 
environment “extends from the eastern Indian Ocean to the island states of Poly-
nesia, and from the equator to the Southern Ocean�”5 In their comprehensive and 
far-reaching assessment of Australia’s approach to amphibious warfare, Beyond 
2017, Ken Gleiman and Peter Dean noted that most of the population centers 
and strategic infrastructure in Australia’s primary operating environment are 
situated within twenty-five kilometers of the coastline� Although just 5 percent 
(approximately) of that coastline can be used to unload large ships, 75 percent 
can be accessed by hovercraft and 95 percent can be used by small boats� More-
over, approximately 25 percent of the beaches can accommodate landing craft�6 In 
short, the ADF’s primary operating environment is “maritime and archipelagic in 
nature” and, as a result, is tailor-made for amphibious operations�7
While Australia’s primary operating environment is larger in scope than that 
of New Zealand, it is notable that their overlapping areas in the South Pacific 
are characterized by “complex riverine systems and archipelagos�”8 When the 
assortment of unstable countries along the Pacific Rim and the potential for 
NWC_Spring2017Review.indb   114 2/22/17   9:32 AM
 PAG E T  1 1 5
natural disasters are considered, it is not hard to envision that Australia and New 
Zealand increasingly may be required to respond to events in the region� Indeed, 
Professor Paul Dibb of the Australian National University has observed that there 
is likely to be an ongoing requirement for “humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief, capacity building and governance, potential peacekeeping operations, and 
military intervention” in the South Pacific�9 The 2016 Australian Defence White 
Paper acknowledged: “To help countries in our immediate neighbourhood re-
spond to the challenges they face, Australia will continue to play an important 
regional leadership role� Our strategic weight, proximity, and resources place 
high expectations on us to respond to instability or natural disasters, and climate 
change means we will be called on to do so more often� We will continue to play 
that role in close collaboration with New Zealand, France, the United States, 
Japan, and other partners�”10
The necessary responses to these challenges are likely to require, at least in 
part, a commitment of an amphibious nature� Indeed, recent experience has 
borne out the utility of amphibious capability, in both domestic and regional 
contexts� Both Australia and New Zealand contributed to the Australian-led re-
gional assistance mission in the Solomon Islands in 2003� After Australian forces 
had been deployed by landing craft and Sea King helicopters from the amphibi-
ous platform (LPA) Her Majesty’s Australian Ship (HMAS) Manoora (L 52), it 
was observed that the presence of the ship, in concert with land and air power, 
“signalled to criminals and law-abiding citizens alike that the intervention in the 
Solomon Islands was to be taken seriously�”11 However, while Australia’s amphibi-
ous assets were sufficient for operations in the Solomon Islands, the ADF proved 
to be “significantly constrained in what it could offer” to relief operations in the 
Aceh region of Indonesia following the 2004 tsunami, largely “because of the 
limitations of the amphibious vessels at its disposal�”12
Just a year later, the utility of amphibious capability was demonstrated by op-
erations in both East Timor and Fiji� Following tension between the Fijian mili-
tary and the civilian government, the ADF deployed three vessels, including the 
LPA HMAS Kanimbla (L 51), for a potential permissive withdrawal of Australian 
citizens and approved foreign nationals as part of Operation QUICKSTEP� In the 
end, the successful coup proved to be bloodless, but QUICKSTEP “reinforced the 
potential benefits expected to accrue with the acquisition of more highly capable 
helicopter-carrying amphibious ships in the years ahead�”13 During Operation 
ASTUTE, which was designed to restore stability to East Timor, Kanimbla and 
Manoora formed part of an amphibious ready group (ARG) that managed to land 
an infantry battalion and supporting vehicles in three days, even without the use 
of Dili harbor�14
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Closer to home, the significance of amphibious capability was demonstrated 
when Tropical Cyclone Yasi hit northern Queensland on February 3, 2011� Un-
fortunately, the heavy landing craft (LCH) HMAS Tobruk (L 50) was unavailable, 
as were Kanimbla and Manoora� Two Balikpapan-class heavy landing craft were 
available, but they lacked vital capabilities such as enhanced communications, 
hospital facilities, and helicopter support�15 Following the Christchurch earth-
quake in the same year, Her Majesty’s New Zealand Ship (HMNZS) Canterbury 
(L 421), the sealift and amphibious support vessel of the Royal New Zealand Navy 
(RNZN), transported personnel, vehicles, fuel, generators, and stores across a 
range of supply voyages�16
Whether one views the South Pacific as an “arc of instability” or an “arc of 
opportunity,” it is clear that amphibious capability is inherently useful in that 
operating environment, as has been discussed repeatedly in Australian and New 
Zealand policy and strategy documents�17 In Future 35: Our Strategy to 2035, the 
NZDF asserted that the “JATF will be able to conduct a wide range of tasks and 
meet the key requirements expected of it in the Southwest Pacific�”18 Equally, the 
2013 Australian Defence White Paper noted that the nation’s amphibious force 
will be the “central plank” in Australia’s “ability to conduct security and stabilisa-
tion missions in the region�”19
Amphibious forces also provide an inherently useful tool for regional engage-
ment�20 Australia and New Zealand both have contributed to Pacific Partnership, 
a U�S�-led humanitarian and civic assistance initiative that has been supported 
by Canada, France, Japan, and Malaysia as well� Tellingly, both nations have 
contributed amphibious assets to Pacific Partnership� In 2010, Tobruk, one of 
three deployed Royal Australian Navy (RAN) ships, served as the command 
vessel for Pacific Partnership�21 During the 2011 iteration, Canterbury served as 
the headquarters for Pacific Partnership and was assisted by HMAS Betano (L 
133) and HMAS Balikpapan (L 126), which provided ship-to-shore logistic and 
personnel transport�22 In 2013, Australia took charge of the Papua New Guinea 
segment, with Tobruk taking the lead, while New Zealand later led the phases in 
the Republic of Kiribati and the Solomon Islands� Canterbury also served as the 
flagship for the Solomon Islands phase of the operation� During those phases, 
Australian and New Zealand personnel, as well as those from other nations, 
provided medical and dental care, conducted engineering and building projects, 
led community-engagement initiatives, and cleared remaining Second World 
War ordnance�23 However, Pacific Partnership is just one opportunity to generate 
goodwill and enhance interoperability�
Given Australia’s stated desire to increase engagement with a range of regional 
nations, including Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, and 
Japan, amphibious forces offer a platform for increased interaction�24 Notably, the 
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concurrent interest in amphibious operations in those nations presents a conve-
nient and relevant avenue for engagement for both Australia and New Zealand� 
Ultimately, the nature of Australia and New Zealand’s primary operating envi-
ronments and the tasks the ADF and NZDF are likely to be required to undertake 
provide an obvious use for amphibious forces� Thus, national interests combine 
with the renaissance of amphibious capability in the Asia-Pacific region to drive 
the development of robust amphibious forces�
A “DISTINCTLY AUSTRALIAN” FORCE: AUSTRALIAN  
AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY
Progress toward the validation of the new Australian amphibious force is well 
under way and is scheduled to be completed in 2017� The centerpieces of the 
force are the two Canberra-class helicopter landing docks (LHDs), HMAS Can-
berra (L 02) and HMAS Adelaide (L 01), which are 27,000-ton vessels that can 
land over one thousand personnel, their vehicles, and other logistic support by 
either helicopter or watercraft�25 As part of Plan BEERSHEBA, the projected land-
ing force will be drawn from 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (2RAR)�26 
The amphibious force will be supported by Aegis-fitted all-purpose Hobart-class 
air-warfare destroyers�27
Importantly, Australia has developed a scalable force that will constitute an 
amphibious ready element (ARE) or an ARG� The ARG is the more capable 
force structure, as it will comprise both LHDs, which will embark an amphibi-
ous battle group and the requisite enablers, and be supported by the Bay-class 
landing ship HMAS Choules (L 100)� It is anticipated that the ARG would be an 
element of a joint task force made up of afloat-support ships, escorts, and mine- 
countermeasure (MCM) assets� The ARE most likely will be deployed for hu-
manitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) and stabilization operations, 
as well as noncombatant evacuations� The ARE will be based on a single LHD 
and deploy a combined-arms combat team plus medical, aviation, logistic, and 
prelanding force elements� Although war fighting is not the intended purpose of 
the ARE, it can perform that function in a limited way�28 Australia already has 
certified the ARE, during the SEA SERIES exercises that were conducted off the 
coast of northern Queensland between August 17 and October 6, 2015�29 The 
certification process will be completed when the ARG is validated in 2017�
In recognition of the importance of interoperability and to develop the most 
effective force possible, the ADF has sought input from both the United Kingdom 
and the United States� In addition to the lateral transfer of a number of senior 
Royal Navy and Royal Marines personnel, the ADF has benefited from the input 
of liaison officers�30 In fact, a Royal Marines colonel subsequently transferred to 
the RAN after completion of his liaison position in the amphibious task force 
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headquarters� Most notably, the U�S� Marine Corps (USMC) has assigned a 
colonel with amphibious experience to serve as “Colonel, Amphibious,” which 
involves acting as the amphibious capability development lead within Deployable 
Joint Force Headquarters�31
In view of the fact that Australia and New Zealand share an immediate re-
gion and that the defense relationship between the two nations is “built on deep 
mutual security interests” and “a willingness to make positive contributions to 
regional and global security and stability operations,” efforts have been made to 
enhance the interoperability of the amphibious forces of the ADF and NZDF�32 
Specifically, the ADF has taken active steps to ensure that integration is possible 
with the NZDF’s JTF� Most notably, an NZDF officer is permanently present in 
the ADF’s deployable joint headquarters through the J35 position, which in-
volves transitioning plans into operations� Consequently, the ADF and NZDF 
are “linked together” in the development of their amphibious forces and for the 
planning of amphibious operations�33 Importantly, New Zealand, and particu-
larly U�K� and U�S�, input has been refined for the Australian context to ensure 
that, rather than replicating the force of another nation, the Australian one is, in 
the words of Major General Stuart Smith, Commander, Deployable Joint Force 
Headquarters, a “distinctly Australian amphibious force�”34
FROM JATF TO JTF: NEW ZEALAND AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY
In September 2015, Captain Mark Worsfold, RNZN, opined that the NZDF “must 
conduct and lead missions in the South Pacific and it must also enable New 
Zealand to contribute meaningfully to regional and international security with 
partners and friends�”35 An effective amphibious capability provides an important 
means to respond to and shape events in the South Pacific� That notion was evi-
dent in the 2011 New Zealand Defence Capability Plan, which was centered on 
the intention to develop a JATF�36 It was expected that the JATF would be opera-
tional by 2015 and would be “able to conduct a wide range of tasks and meet the 
key requirements expected of it in the Southwest Pacific�”37 In 2013, the NZDF 
explicitly stated as follows:
By 2020, with the JATF at its core, the Defence Force will be capable of conducting 
amphibious military operations and responding to emergencies at home and abroad, 
and projecting and sustaining land or maritime forces with increased combat utility, 
either on its own or as part of a wider coalition� This combat capability will act as an 
effective and credible deterrent for any challenge to New Zealand’s sovereignty and to 
stability in the wider Southwest Pacific region�38
Although it was anticipated that the JATF would be combat capable, it was 
acknowledged that the likely tasks required of the force would be much more 
diverse� It was considered that the JATF would be involved more regularly in 
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noncombat missions in New Zealand and overseas, including “search and rescue; 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; resource protection in the EEZ [ex-
clusive economic zone]; maritime border security; and evacuating New Zealand 
and approved foreign nationals from high-risk environments�”39
Although the label JATF has been dropped, the NZDF has continued the drive 
to generate an effective amphibious force� The JTF will be mission specific and 
its composition will vary, depending on the likely requirements of the force� It is 
intended that the NZDF will be able to deploy a company-sized force into a low-
threat environment and that the force should be self-sufficient for up to thirty 
days� Although the JTF is capable of undertaking a range of roles, it is likely to 
be used in three scenarios: in HA/DR operations, in security operations, or as a 
component of a multinational force�
Canterbury is the central platform for the NZDF’s JTF� Commander Andrew 
Law, Naval Support, Amphibious Lead in the NZDF’s Capability Branch, empha-
sizes: “There is more to amphibious operations than just Canterbury, but without 
Canterbury you don’t really have an amphibious force�”40 The ship is notable for 
incorporating the roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) designs of commercial ferries� Can-
terbury has been the subject of vociferous criticism on occasion and even was 
labeled the RNZN’s “problem ship” in the media�41 However, while its features 
differ from those of traditional amphibious vessels, Canterbury is actually a ca-
pable and flexible ship�
The ship can transport approximately 250 personnel (in addition to the crew) 
and has “the ability to land personnel, vehicles, and cargo by landing craft, heli-
copter, or ramps, as well as conventional port infrastructure�”42 The ship possesses 
important command-and-control (C2) facilities and also has a self-contained 
hospital with surgical capability�43 Canterbury will be supported by a range of 
other surface vessels� The RNZN’s two Anzac-class frigates, HMNZS Te Kaha 
(F 77) and HMNZS Te Mana (F 111), are entrusted with a range of tasks, which 
include a force-protection role for the JTF�44 Some support also can be provided 
by HMNZS Endeavour (A 11), a replenishment tanker, but the capability will be 
enhanced when the ship is replaced�45 Currently, HMNZS Manawanui (A 09), 
the RNZN’s diving and MCM support ship, can provide limited littoral warfare 
support, but its replacement will offer a range of additional capabilities�46
The landing force will be provided by the New Zealand Army, but it will not 
be a standing force� The composition of the force will depend on the nature of 
the operation� For example, a force consisting predominantly of medics and 
engineers could be deployed for HA/DR activities, but for security operations 
an infantry company could be used� Although the landing force will be combat 
capable, it is not expected to conduct opposed landings� Indeed, in 2015, Rear 
Admiral Jack R� Steer, then New Zealand’s chief of navy, affirmed: “You’ll never 
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see Canterbury storming onto a hostile beach; that’s not what we do�”47 Inevitably, 
there is a limit to what the initial landing force can achieve, and it is likely to be 
set a limited objective, such as opening an airport or seaport�
In addition to capability decisions, the generation of an amphibious mind-set 
within the NZDF also has been an important focus and has been driven by the 
conduct of a range of activities, including the biennial SOUTHERN KATIPO exer-
cises (2013 and 2015) and the JOINT WAKA exercises that commenced in 2016�48 
Given the design of Canterbury, a shift in mentality away from sealift and toward 
amphibiosity was required� Lieutenant Commander Kathryn Hill, RNZN, the 
amphibious operations (maritime) staff officer in the Capability Branch, has 
acknowledged that there has been a “culture change” over time as the army has 
become more accustomed to operating on Canterbury�49 Rather than just bring-
ing together single-service skills, the JTF needs to be a joint force characterized 
by cooperation and cohesion� Practice in the joint environment is essential to 
developing an amphibious mentality� Equally, the capacity for the JTF to “plug 
and play” in a multinational environment is extremely important�50
Although New Zealand has not followed the Australian approach of using 
liaison officers from other amphibious forces, the NZDF has been involved in 
extensive knowledge sharing with potential overseas partners and nations with 
amphibious experience� Discussions have been held with representatives from a 
wide range of nations and organizations, including the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and NATO� Australia, as New Zealand’s most likely 
multinational partner, has been the subject of a wider range of discussions and 
agreements� Initial doctrine for the development of the new JTF was based on 
Australian standards and an interoperability framework was agreed for other 
ar eas, such as equipment� In reference to discussions with representatives from 
other amphibious forces, Commodore John Campbell, the NZDF’s maritime 
component commander, has asserted that the information is invaluable, as there 
is “no point in re-learning their lessons�” However, at the same time, he acknowl-
edged that there is a need to apply those lessons to the New Zealand context, as 
not all their experience is relevant to the NZDF, given the variances in capability�51
A PROBLEM SHARED IS A PROBLEM HALVED:  
THE LEGACY OF ANZAC AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY
As Gallipoli reminds us, amphibious operations are not a new concept for either 
Australia or New Zealand� For the sake of accuracy, it should be remembered 
that, while Gallipoli has captured the historical consciousness of Australia and 
New Zealand, both nations conducted amphibious operations prior to the Dar-
danelles campaign� The amphibious expeditionary operations conducted in 
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1914 in German New Guinea and Samoa by Australians and New Zealanders, 
respectively, often are overlooked in the public discourse, but they represent 
important markers in the development of Anzac amphibiosity�52 While Australia 
has accumulated a more extensive amphibious history since then, both nations 
have been involved in operations of an amphibious nature� During the Second 
World War, the Australians conducted a range of amphibious operations in the 
Southwest Pacific Area, most notably at New Guinea in 1943 and Borneo in 
1945�53 New Zealand had less experience with amphibious warfare in that war, 
but did participate in some notable operations, not least GOODTIME, which took 
place in the Treasury Islands in 1943�54
An examination of all the amphibious operations Australia and New Zealand 
have conducted is beyond the scope of this article, especially given that the 
composition and purpose of the contemporary amphibious forces differ widely 
from those of the Second World War� However, recent events have demonstrated 
an ongoing requirement for collective amphibious capability� Indeed, contem-
porary Anzac military cooperation is far from a novel idea� During the 1990s, 
the idea that Australia and New Zealand should be considered a single strategic 
entity was floated�55 In retrospect, such a notion may seem excessive, but the na-
tions undoubtedly continue to share strategic interests� The push to establish an 
Anzac Ready Response Force / Anzac Ready Reaction Force in 2011, to provide 
a joint response to emergencies in the South Pacific, demonstrated an increasing 
alignment in outlooks� This had been shaped by the involvement of the ADF and 
NZDF in a range of operations, particularly in East Timor�56
Australia’s commitment to the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) 
in 1999, to restore peace and security following increasing violence after the 
independence vote, prompted General Peter Cosgrove to describe the ADF’s 
amphibious capability as one of “first resort�”57 However, from an amphibious 
perspective, INTERFET provided a number of lessons about the adequacy of the 
ADF’s capability and the importance of having reliable and competent allies� In 
his overarching analysis of Australian amphibious operations between 1901 and 
2001, Russell Parkin, then a major in the Australian Army, asserted that without 
the naval contributions from New Zealand, Singapore, and the United States, the 
RAN “would have been unable to cope with the complexities of the operation 
because of its limited amphibious and sea lift capability, especially in the areas of 
force protection, mobility, and logistics�”58
The determination of which NZDF force elements would be committed was 
conducted, in part, through consultation between the Australian and New Zea-
land chiefs of defense forces�59 From a New Zealand viewpoint, Paul Sinclair of 
Victoria University of Wellington has summarized:
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For the first phase of the initial intervention mission in Timor known as INTERFET, 
Australia had the full range of military capabilities, the will, and the funding to as-
sume leadership of the multinational coalition� New Zealand could not have done so, 
but we did provide a wider range of capabilities than any of the 15 other countries 
which participated� We also brought to the table a common doctrinal basis for opera-
tions and command and control�60
RNZN ships were placed under Australian control and played varied roles in 
operations� The capacity to use Dili harbor was crucial for the conduct of op-
erations, but it did not diminish the importance of amphibious capability or the 
contribution of the surface vessels�
Coalition ships performed escort and close-protection functions, monitored 
and identified surface and air contacts, provided logistic support for forces 
ashore, and delivered humanitarian aid�61 The initial amphibious operations 
necessitated protection operations, which were conducted by a range of vessels 
from Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in-
cluding HMNZS Te Kaha�62 Even when the initial operations were completed, the 
requirement for escorts remained� For example, HMNZS Canterbury (a Leander-
class frigate that was decommissioned in 2005) was involved in escorting thirty 
amphibious and supply ships safely into Dili�63
Australian naval historian David Stevens concluded that “close cooperation 
proved crucial to getting the best out of scarce assets,” which perhaps was char-
acterized best by the assertion of Canterbury’s commanding officer, Commander 
Warren Cummins, that his ship effectively “became an Australian frigate�”64 Tell-
ingly, New Zealand strategic expert Robert Ayson has reflected, “New Zealand’s 
largest military deployment since the Korean War helped to underscore the 
value of trans-Tasman defence cooperation in the nearer neighbourhood—not 
on the basis of a formal agreement but, rather, in terms of real-time cooperation 
in regional crisis management�”65 Operations in the region after INTERFET, par-
ticularly those of a HA/DR nature, demonstrated the ever-increasing relevance 
of amphibious capability�
More recently, the deployment of ADF and NZDF elements to support the 
HA/DR operation in Fiji following Tropical Cyclone Winston, which struck on 
February 20, 2016, has demonstrated an ongoing commitment to amphibious 
operations� From an ADF perspective, Operation FIJI ASSIST (as the Australians 
named it) was notable as the first deployment of HMAS Canberra on a HA/DR 
operation�66 Robert Farley of the University of Kentucky has posited: “Relief of 
Fiji is precisely the kind of operation that Australia envisioned for Canberra and 
her sister [Adelaide]�”67 The vessel transported three MRH-90 helicopters and 
an army engineering element, as well as sixty tons of emergency relief supplies, 
which served as a supplement to the preexisting Australian relief effort�68 The 
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ship was stationed off Koro Island on arrival and commenced operations on 
March 2, following beach-clearance activities being conducted by elements of 
2RAR� The landing sites were described as “hives of activity” as “all manner of 
berthing and mechanised capabilities came ashore�”69
With almost five hundred personnel being deployed, the operation constituted 
“one of the NZDF’s largest peacetime deployments to the Pacific�”70 Canterbury 
was deployed with 293 personnel, two NH90 helicopters, an SH-2 Seasprite he-
licopter, and forty-five vehicles, as well as 106 tons of relief supplies�71 The vessel 
served as the “maritime base” for the NZDF’s HA/DR efforts in Fiji’s northern 
outer islands�72 HMNZS Wellington (P 55), an offshore patrol vessel, not only 
delivered sixty tons of aid and transported seventy-one military personnel; as 
the advance force, it also surveyed the entrances into the reef and anchorages to 
ensure that Canterbury could operate safely� The ship also identified beaches for 
Canterbury’s landing craft to use�73
The assistance the ADF and NZDF provided was invaluable to residents 
in disaster-struck areas and demonstrated the logic of enhancing amphibious 
capability in the Pacific� The potential for cooperation between the ADF and 
NZDF is particularly pertinent, given the opportunity to operate two different 
response groups, with one Australian LHD working with Choules, the other with 
Canterbury�
INTEROPERABILITY
In 2005, Lieutenant General James Mattis, USMC, declared, “You cannot do any-
thing today without being part of a coalition� � � � This is a military consideration, 
not a political one� Coalition warfare is a reality and a fact�”74 Mattis was right to 
emphasize the significance of coalition warfare, but the truth is that multinational 
cooperation is a reality to be reckoned with across the entire spectrum of opera-
tions� Amphibious forces are certainly no exception to this rule�
Given the likelihood of Australia and New Zealand operating alongside each 
other, it is essential that their amphibious forces be capable of working together 
as effectively as possible� In September 2015, Australia’s then minister for defense 
Kevin J� Andrews asserted, “The bilateral relationship with New Zealand is one 
of Australia’s most enduring and important defence partnerships� We are com-
mitted to deepening our strategic dialogue, practical cooperation, and enhancing 
our interoperability with New Zealand�”75
Equally, interoperability with other likely multinational partners in the region 
is a foremost consideration for both the ADF and NZDF� Historically, the United 
States has stood out as an important multinational partner for both nations, as 
they were “united by a common language, similar cultures and institutions, and 
the experience of the Second World War�”76 While those factors are still relevant, 
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the trilateral relationship among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States 
(ANZUS) has undergone turbulent times� Nevertheless, the three nations remain 
united by a common interest in the Pacific�
Australia and the United States have taken a number of noteworthy steps to 
improve cohesion between their militaries and to enhance amphibious capability� 
The 2014 Force Posture Agreement, signed by Australia and the United States, 
provided for the rotation of 2,500 U�S� Marines through Darwin and an increase 
in air cooperation�77 The subsequent announcement by the U�S� Navy’s then Chief 
of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert that the United States would 
elevate the Marine Rotational Force Darwin to Marine expeditionary unit status 
and provide amphibious ships to create a U�S� ARG by the end of the decade dem-
onstrated the significance attached to amphibious capability in the region and 
the importance of interoperability�78 With the rotation of U�S� Marines through 
Darwin, it has been suggested that the area could become a “hub for training” 
alongside the amphibious forces of other nations, including New Zealand�79
While similar advancements in relation to amphibious capability have not oc-
curred in New Zealand, significant developments have taken place in defense co-
operation with the United States more broadly, which are particularly noteworthy 
in the wake of the 1980s ANZUS crisis� Following the New Zealand government’s 
decision to reject a visit from USS Buchanan (DDG 14) in 1985, in line with its 
policy of preventing nuclear-powered or -armed ships from entering the nation’s 
ports, the United States broke off military cooperation and withdrew its security 
guarantee�80 Subsequently, George P� Shultz, Secretary of State, declared: “We part 
as friends, but we part company�”81
Recent developments have suggested that the United States and New Zealand 
are moving closer together again, cautiously� The Wellington (2010) and Wash-
ington (2012) Declarations provided for increased security cooperation (includ-
ing in HA/DR operations) and greater defense collaboration in the Asia-Pacific 
(with a particular focus on maritime operations), respectively� The “warming of 
ties,” which culminated in Condoleezza Rice describing New Zealand as “a friend 
and an ally,” has been viewed as a reflection of New Zealand’s commitment of 
forces to Afghanistan and the nation’s willingness to “participate more widely in 
the post-9/11 counter-terrorism agenda�”82
New Zealand’s return to the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in 2012 
and the NZDF’s participation in a range of other exercises have provided a plat-
form for increased cooperation with the United States� In fact, the analyst Jack 
Georgieff has gone so far as to suggest that “the best in bilateral defense relations 
may be yet to come�”83 Ayson has surmised that, while a “formal alliance relation-
ship (including a return to full ANZUS relations) still seems most unlikely,” it is 
“no exaggeration to say that New Zealand is now an informal ally of the United 
NWC_Spring2017Review.indb   124 2/22/17   9:32 AM
 PAG E T  1 2 5
States�”84 Given the deepening defense relations with the United States and the 
increasing American commitment to amphibious capability in the Asia-Pacific, 
it would be logical for Australia and New Zealand to consider increased coopera-
tion in the area of amphibious operations�
Furthermore, although the U�S� Pacific Command includes over two hundred 
vessels, questions have been raised over whether there is sufficient amphibi-
ous shipping capacity to support the rebalance toward the Pacific�85 Fitted with 
advanced C2 suites, flight decks for rotary-wing operations, a well dock for wa-
terborne craft, and storage for vehicles and logistics materials, the RAN’s LHDs 
could alleviate some of the pressure on the United States to deploy amphibious 
ships to the Pacific�86 The recent suggestion that USMC personnel might be 
deployed aboard foreign vessels provided further indication that capable and 
reliable allies with amphibious capacity are of great value to the United States�87 
Although Canterbury does not provide the same range of capabilities as the 
LHDs, it is still a useful asset, and multinational partners are likely to value highly 
any increase in sealift� The increased focus on amphibious capability in the Asia-
Pacific means that any capacity to contribute meaningfully in that area is of great 
significance�
France represents another potential focus of cooperation in amphibious op-
erations, given shared interests in the Pacific� In reference to the Pacific, France’s 
2013 White Paper on Defence and National Security contended: “The stakes of our 
sovereignty have to be defended there, just as the security of our citizens exposed 
to climate hazards needs to be guaranteed, notably through the FRANZ arrange-
ments (France–Australia–New Zealand)�”88 The FRANZ arrangements, which 
rest on a 1992 exchange of letters, make provision for regional disaster-relief 
coordination� The significance of these arrangements has been demonstrated 
during a number of operations, including relief efforts in the Solomon Islands 
after the 2007 tsunami�89
The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade recognized the im-
portance of the tripartite relationship with France and New Zealand, as well as 
the complementary liaison with the United States, when it stated an ambition to 
“[p]romote long-term strategic cooperation in the Pacific region, drawing on the 
Quadrilateral Defense Coordinating Group exchanges between Australia and 
France in liaison with New Zealand and the United States, and on preparation 
and implementation of joint action under the FRANZ Agreement in response to 
natural disasters in the Pacific�”90
Ultimately, the nature of Australia and New Zealand’s primary operating envi-
ronment means that an attentiveness to amphibious capability is entirely logical, 
and an ability to interoperate with friendly nations that also maintain interests in 
the region is a practical necessity�
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MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION: THE BENEFITS OF EXERCISING
In addition to providing important opportunities for engagement, multinational 
exercises provide essential avenues for enhancing interoperability� The ADF and 
NZDF actively engage in exercises based in Australia and New Zealand, as well as 
farther afield� TALISMAN SABRE, a biennial exercise conducted by Australian and 
U�S� forces to enhance capability and improve interoperability across the spec-
trum of operations up to high-end combat, is a particularly important endeavor, 
given the ADF’s expanding interest in amphibious operations�
Over thirty thousand Australian and U�S� personnel participated in TALISMAN 
SABRE 2015, in conjunction with forces from Japan and New Zealand�91 Interest-
ingly, NZDF forces participated as part of the ADF element, while Japanese ele-
ments were embedded with U�S� units�92 Large-scale amphibious operations took 
center stage, and one focal point of the exercise was the amphibious landing of 
250 2RAR soldiers and large numbers of U�S� Marines at Fog Bay near Darwin�93 
However, it is worth noting that, owing to the unavailability of Canberra, the 
ADF’s amphibious contribution to the landings was somewhat more limited than 
would have been ideal�94 Within the NZDF, it was acknowledged that TALISMAN 
SABRE 2015 had the potential to be a formative exercise� In particular, the involve-
ment of the two NH90 helicopters was seen to be extremely significant, as it was 
the first time they had been deployed overseas and led to them being validated 
for “operations throughout the Southwest Pacific�”95 Given the shared interest in 
amphibious operations, the three nations were cognizant of the inherent value 
of the exercise� Ultimately, Commander Michael Posey, the lead USN planner, 
noted, “During TS15 we demonstrated our Pacific partnership with the Austra-
lians and Kiwis�”96
Exercises hosted in New Zealand also have provided worthwhile opportuni-
ties for the regular interaction of amphibious forces� During SOUTHERN KATIPO 
2013, forces from New Zealand and nine other nations (Australia, Canada, 
France, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Tonga, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States) responded to a request from a fictional South Pacific 
nation to restore law and order, which resulted in Canterbury evacuating citi-
zens�97 The exercise was designed to assess the NZDF’s ability to conduct a joint 
amphibious operation alongside a range of multinational partners� Colonel John 
Howard, New Zealand Army, exercise commander, stressed the importance of 
amphibious operations: “We have great opportunities here to train for beach 
assaults and to conduct non-opposed amphibious landings, to parachute in, and 
to spread out for a whole range of tactical tasks�”98
The scenario for SOUTHERN KATIPO 2015 envisioned that New Zealand was 
required to deploy a task force to evacuate foreign nationals and assist police 
in restoring security and stability� The exercise consisted of 2,500 personnel, 
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including from Australia, Canada, Fiji, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, 
Tonga, the United Kingdom, and the United States, conducting HA/DR and 
stabilization operations�99 As part of the exercise, Canterbury, with support from 
Wellington, conducted an amphibious landing of NZDF and multinational per-
sonnel and equipment, including MAN-produced medium and heavy operation-
al vehicles, at Okiwi Bay in the Marlborough Sounds, located in the northern part 
of the South Island of New Zealand�100 Aside from the generic benefits obtained 
from exercising with multinational partners, the exercise was particularly valu-
able in that it provided an opportunity to test the Anzac Ready Reaction Force�
While nationally based exercises such as SOUTHERN KATIPO and TALISMAN 
SABRE remain the principal focus of the ADF and NZDF, participation in vari-
ous internationally hosted multinational exercises provides a range of benefits� 
The U�S� Navy and U�S� Marine Corps host a multinational exercise that focuses 
on enhancing amphibious tactics, techniques, and procedures known as BOLD 
ALLIGATOR� The 2012 iteration, in which both Australia and New Zealand par-
ticipated, involved a Marine expeditionary brigade–sized amphibious assault 
from a sea base in a medium-threat environment� BOLD ALLIGATOR 2014 was 
centered on strengthening amphibious cooperation in the areas of HA/DR opera-
tions, theater security, and noncombatant evacuations� Participants came from all 
over the world, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom�101 The benefits to participation in BOLD ALLIGATOR are 
twofold� First, both nations have the opportunity to observe the development of 
cooperation between their more experienced USN and USMC counterparts� Sec-
ond, the multinational nature of the exercise provides an opportunity to enhance 
interoperability with a range of nations, including a number of potential partners 
in operations in their primary operating environment�
The U�S�-hosted DAWN BLITZ exercise offers another avenue for coopera-
tion� DAWN BLITZ 2013 involved exercising core U�S� amphibious capabilities 
alongside forces from Canada, Japan, and New Zealand� The event culminated 
with an amphibious landing (at Red Beach, Camp Pendleton, California) by 
seventy amphibious assault vehicles and six landing craft, air-cushion vehicles� 
DAWN BLITZ 2015 incorporated forces from Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and 
the United States� New Zealand’s contribution consisted of 102 personnel from 
the Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment� In addition, logistics personnel oper-
ated on board the ships� Notably, NZDF personnel conducted a beach assault in 
eight amphibious assault vehicles� The ADF did not participate in either exercise, 
but Australian observers were present to glean lessons for their own amphibious 
force� Rear Admiral Daniel H� Fillion, USN, commented, “It’s a chance for our 
partners to teach us how they do amphibious operations, and hopefully, they’ll 
learn from us how we conduct them�”102 Given New Zealand’s comparatively 
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limited resources and the likelihood of the NZDF operating as part of a mul-
tinational force, the experience obtained from participation in DAWN BLITZ is 
invaluable�
RIMPAC, which is conducted in and around the Hawaiian Islands, is the 
largest multinational maritime exercise in the world� During RIMPAC 2012, the 
ADF was placed in command of the maritime component—the first time a nation 
other than the United States had been responsible for planning and commanding 
the maritime aspects of the exercise�103 Throughout the exercise, the Australian 
Army worked closely with the U�S� Marine Corps to “further develop” the ADF’s 
amphibious capability�104 Notably, Captain Ken Semmens, Australian Army, was 
embedded with the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Platoon, Combat Assault Com-
pany, 3rd Marine Regiment (USMC) during the conduct of amphibious opera-
tions at Kaneohe Bay� The experience was considered invaluable for the exposure 
it provided him to mission planning and amphibious capabilities�105 New Zealand 
also participated in RIMPAC for the first time in twenty-five years by contribut-
ing a range of assets, including two ships and a rifle platoon from the Royal New 
Zealand Infantry Regiment, which was integrated with the U�S� Marine Corps 
aboard USS Essex (LHD 2), as were various headquarters staff members�106 Major 
General A� David Gawn, New Zealand Army, described RIMPAC as a “unique 
training opportunity,” particularly given the ability of the infantry platoon to 
“embed in a U�S� Marine Corps company and conduct amphibious taskings�”107
The theme of RIMPAC 2014 was “capable, adaptive partners�”108 ADF elements 
engaged in a range of activities, including contributing to an amphibious land-
ing� The Australian amphibious task group, which had its headquarters aboard 
USS Peleliu (LHA 5), was afforded command of an expeditionary strike group 
comprising thirteen warships and a multinational landing force of soldiers and 
marines from ten nations, including New Zealand and the United States� Ten 
amphibious missions were undertaken in total, including amphibious assaults, 
amphibious raids, and noncombatant evacuations� During those missions, Aus-
tralian soldiers conducted amphibious training with U�S� forces, as well as sol-
diers and marines from various other nations�109 Commodore Peter Leavy, RAN, 
reflected that the exercise provided “an exciting opportunity to prepare for the 
new amphibious capabilities being introduced for the Australian Defence Force 
over the next few years�”110
The NZDF deployed over 250 personnel and assets from all three service 
branches� The most relevant activity, from an amphibious perspective, was Can-
terbury’s contribution to the HA/DR element of the exercise, which involved 
transporting vehicles and supplies to shore via landing craft� The ship also was 
used to transport U�S� Army and USMC personnel� A light infantry platoon 
from the Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment also assisted in a noncombatant 
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evacuation operation�111 In addition, it is worth noting that Canterbury trans-
ported in excess of one hundred Australian Army soldiers and their kit to the ex-
ercise�112 The fact that an RNZN ship docked at Pearl Harbor for the first time in 
over thirty years was viewed by the White House as a symbol of “renewed engage-
ment on mutual defense and security, especially in the Asia-Pacific region�”113
Ultimately, the combination of the various exercises is fundamental to im-
provements in interoperability between the ADF and NZDF, as well as a range 
of other militaries, which is a central concern for the amphibious forces of both 
Australia and New Zealand�
GOING DUTCH? THE U.K.-NETHERLANDS MODEL
Australia has taken a pragmatic approach to drawing lessons from likely multina-
tional partners, but there is an opportunity for the nation to go one step further 
by considering a model adopted by the United Kingdom and the Netherlands� 
The UKNLAF, which was established by the signing of a memorandum of under-
standing (MOU) on May 9, 1973, is an exemplar of European force integration� 
As Europe’s oldest integrated force, the UKNLAF has been labeled an example 
of defense avant la lettre�114 The UKNLAF was established to “create a combined 
force capable of operating together across the full spectrum of military opera-
tions from benign peacekeeping operations right up to sustained, high intensity 
war fighting�”115
More recently, its importance has been affirmed by agreement on a new MOU 
designed to enhance the UKNLAF, in line with the European Amphibious Initia-
tive at the turn of the twenty-first century and the signing, on the fortieth anni-
versary of the combined force, of a new letter of intent on future cooperation�116 
The UKNLAF emphasizes complete integration, with training, exercises, and op-
erations being conducted under a unified command structure� Importantly, the 
UKNLAF uses common doctrine and compatible equipment and C2 facilities� 
Recent deployments to the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq have demonstrated the 
capacity of the force to engage in operations “ranging from low-level intervention 
and peacekeeping to high-intensity warfighting�”117
Inevitably, assets available for the UKNLAF have changed over time� Initially 
designed with the intention of integrating a single troop of the Royal Netherlands 
Marine Corps (Korps Mariniers) and a (British) Royal Marine Commando unit, 
the UKNLAF now can call on a brigade-sized force� In total, the Dutch manpow-
er contribution is approximately 1,000–1,100 personnel� In addition to increases 
in personnel, there also have been improvements in the platforms available for 
the force� Since 1998, the landing platform dock (LPD) His Netherlands Majesty’s 
Ship (HNLMS) Rotterdam (L 800) has been available to the UKNLAF� The ship is 
fitted with a helicopter deck and a submergible dock and is capable of deploying 
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approximately six hundred marines�118 A newer LPD, HNLMS Johan de Witt (L 
801), offers a range of capabilities, including the capacity to act as a command 
ship, with facilities for a one-star joint headquarters aboard�119 Notably, HNLMS 
Karel Doorman (A 833), a multifunction support ship, was commissioned in 
2014; it possesses both a RO/RO dock and a helicopter deck� The ship will sup-
port the Rotterdam-class LPDs during amphibious operations�120
The UKNLAF model is particularly relevant for New Zealand, as the NZDF is 
a comparatively small force� Naval historian and strategist Geoffrey Till has ap-
praised that small navies can “reasonably compensate for their smallness, if they 
feel the need to, by banding together�”121 However, they also, of course, can seek to 
enhance cooperation with larger militaries to generate a more effective force� In 
that regard, the Netherlands provides a pertinent example for New Zealand� U�K� 
defense strategist Sir Michael E� Quinlan assessed that the UKNLAF was created 
“primarily because the Netherlands could not readily afford its own specialist 
shipping�”122 A RAND study on the strengths and weaknesses of the Netherlands 
armed forces noted that “[t]hey cannot maintain a full suite of capabilities across 
the board, when you consider the scale of the country, the resources they have, 
and manpower required,” before observing that they were “canny” in “pooling 
assets” when “it suits them�”123 The Netherlands approach should resonate with 
New Zealand, given the existence of the Anzac Ready Reaction Force, and there 
certainly is scope for greater cooperation with Australia in the area of amphibious 
capability� In reality, New Zealand’s amphibious capability is limited compared 
with that of the ADF and other regional militaries, so the country must consider 
how to maximize the effectiveness of NZDF assets�
The capacity of the UKNLAF to “nip a crisis in the bud” parallels the likely im-
mediate requirements of the Australian and New Zealand amphibious forces�124 
Given the existence of the UKNLAF and subsequent examples of defense coop-
eration, an Anzac amphibious force would not prove quite so novel, but it would 
be just as, if not more, relevant, given Australia and New Zealand’s contemporary 
strategic environment�
MAXIMIZING THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
With the recent centenary commemoration of the amphibious landings at Gal-
lipoli that forged the basis of the Anzac relationship, it would seem an apt time to 
endeavor to foster interoperability in amphibious operations� Both Australia and 
New Zealand have recognized the importance of amphibious capability in the 
Pacific� Although the scale and scope of the amphibious forces being developed 
differ widely, the impetus for amphibiosity is the same� Cooperation between 
Australia and New Zealand is important for both practical and political reasons� 
The same is true for cooperation with other Pacific players, particularly France 
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and the United States� Shared interests and the requirement to operate in a region 
that may require more amphibious capability than either nation can provide in-
dividually mean that cooperation is essential� Equally, the capacity to plug into 
wider multinational operations is an important driver�
If Australia is to play a leadership role in the region, it will require willing and 
competent partners�125 New Zealand is a natural and logical partner for Australia� 
New Zealand defense analyst Peter Greener observed in 2011: “Whilst there are 
significant differences in the level of capability each country enjoys, and that gap 
is likely to become larger over time, it is clear that Australia values the contribu-
tion that New Zealand makes to combined operations�”126 For New Zealand, op-
erating in a coalition provides “legitimacy and capacity�”127 Equally, since the New 
Zealand military is comparatively small, its enactment of interoperability with 
larger forces can act as a force multiplier� Indeed, Tim Wood of the Centre for De-
fence and Security Studies at Massey University has emphasized that “the NZDF 
is often described as ‘punching above its weight�’ � � � Nevertheless, the simple fact 
remains that the NZDF is expected to do a great deal with comparatively little�”128 
When interests align, operations alongside the ADF provide the opportunity to 
do a good deal more with significantly greater resources�
While there are numerous aspects of the “closer defence relations” that it 
would be logical to strengthen, priority should be accorded to the development of 
interoperability between the amphibious forces of the ADF and NZDF� Progress 
clearly has been made, but there is still some way to go to maximize the effective-
ness of Australian and New Zealand forces during the conduct of bilateral and 
multilateral operations� The fact that the Anzac relationship was founded on an 
amphibious operation is symbolic, but in a practical sense is irrelevant� That said, 
the nature of Australia and New Zealand’s primary operating environment and 
the contemporary utility of amphibious capability ensure that the prioritization 
of amphibiosity is not only a neat bookend but an entirely logical course of ac-
tion� With that in mind, consideration could and should be given to the concept 
of an Anzac amphibious force that would operate analogously to the UKNLAF�
N O T E S
 1� Rod Lyon, “The New Zealand Defence White 
Paper: A More Strategically-Extroverted 
Kiwi?,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute 
Policy Analysis, no� 69 (November 11, 2010), 
p� 3, www�aspi�org�au/�
 2� Ray Griggs, “Chief of Navy,” in Naval Di-
plomacy and Maritime Power Projection, ed� 
Andrew Forbes (Canberra, ACT: Sea Power 
Centre–Australia, 2014), p� 6; New Zealand 
Government, The 2014–2017 Statement of 
Intent (Wellington: New Zealand Defence 
Force [hereafter NZDF], 2014), p� 38�
 3� “Australia,” New Zealand Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, n�d�, www�mfat�govt�nz/�
NWC_Spring2017Review.indb   131 2/22/17   9:32 AM
 1 3 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
 4� The symbolism of Gallipoli should in no way 
allow the campaign to be seen as a bench-
mark of amphibious operations�
 5� Land Warfare Development Centre (Aus-
tralian Army), The Army Objective Force 
2030 Primer (Puckapunyal, Austral�: Defence 
Publishing Service, 2011), p� 8�
 6� Ken Gleiman and Peter J� Dean, Beyond 2017: 
The Australian Defence Force and Amphibious 
Warfare (Barton, ACT: Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute, 2015), pp� 6–17�
 7� Steven Paget, “Old but Gold: The Continued 
Relevance of Naval Gunfire Support for the 
Royal Australian Navy,” Security Challenges 
10, no� 3 (2014), p� 74�
 8� Dean Clark [Capt�, Australian Army], “Aus-
tralia’s Amphibious Ambition,” Australian 
Army Journal 8, no� 1 (Autumn 2011), p� 87�
 9� Paul Dibb, “Managing Australia’s Maritime 
Strategy in an Era of Austerity,” in Naval 
Diplomacy and Maritime Power Projection, 
ed� Forbes, p� 113�
 10� Commonwealth of Australia, 2016 Defence 
White Paper (Canberra, ACT: Department of 
Defence, 2016), p� 56�
 11� John Blaxland, The Australian Army from 
Whitlam to Howard (Melbourne, Austral�: 
Cambridge Univ� Press, 2015), p� 189�
 12� John Blaxland, “Game-Changer in the Pacific: 
Surprising Options Open Up with the New 
Multi-purpose Maritime Capability,” Security 
Challenges 9, no� 3 (2013), p� 37�
 13� Blaxland, The Australian Army from Whitlam 
to Howard, p� 315�
 14� Peter Dean, “Why an Amphibious Capability? 
(Part 2),” The Strategist, November 25, 2013, 
www�aspistrategist�org�au/�
 15� Department of Defence Ministers, “Questions 
and Responses Provided to David Ellery, The 
Canberra Times, in Relation to Articles Pub-
lished on 9 April 2012,” [Australian] Minister 
for Defence, April 9, 2012, www�minister 
�defence�gov�au/�
 16� “Christchurch Earthquake—NZ Defence 
Force—Update 9,” NZDF, February 27, 2011, 
nzdf�mil�nz/�
 17� For a consideration of the challenges and op-
portunities in the South Pacific, see Joanne  
 Wallis, “The South Pacific: ‘Arc of Instability’ 
  or ‘Arc of Opportunity’?,” Global Change, 
Peace & Security 27, no� 1 (2015), pp� 39–53�
 18� NZDF, Future 35: Our Strategy to 2035 (2012), 
nzdf�mil�nz/�
 19� Commonwealth of Australia, Defence White 
Paper 2013 (Canberra, ACT: Department of 
Defence, 2013), p� 63�
 20� Justin Goldman, “An Amphibious Capability 
in Japan’s Self-Defense Force: Operational-
izing Dynamic Defense,” Naval War College 
Review 66, no� 4 (Autumn 2013), p� 131; 
Andrew Maher [Maj�, Australian Army], 
“Regional Special Operations Force Capacity 
Building: An Asymmetric Australian Mari-
time Strategy,” Australian Army Journal 12, 
no� 1 (Winter 2015), p� 60�
 21� “HMAS Tobruk Takes Charge at Pacific Part-
nership,” Defence News, September 1, 2010, 
www�defence�gov�au/�
 22� Nicole Munro, “US Command Moves to 
HMNZS Canterbury for Pacific Partnership,” 
NZDF, April 20, 2011, nzdf�mil�nz/; “Pacific 
Partnership Welcomed to Espiritu Santo, 
Vanuatu,” Australian Government Department 
of Defence, May 3, 2011, www�defence�gov 
�au/�
 23� Samantha J� Webb [Mass Communication 
Specialist 3rd Class, USN], “Australia Leads 
Pacific Partnership Phase in Papua New 
Guinea,” Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, July 
15, 2013, www�cpf�navy�mil/; Samantha J� 
Webb [Mass Communication Specialist 3rd 
Class, USN], “New Zealand Takes Phase Lead 
as Pacific Partnership Arrives in Kiribati,” 
Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, July 15, 2013, 
www�cpf�navy�mil/; Tim D� Godbee [Mass 
Communication Specialist 2nd Class, USN], 
“Pacific Partnership Flag Crosses Decks to 
HMNZS Canterbury,” Commander, U.S. Pacif-
ic Fleet, August 5, 2013, www�cpf�navy�mil/�
 24� See Commonwealth of Australia, 2016 De-
fence White Paper�
 25� “Amphibious Assault Ship (LHD),” Royal 
Australian Navy, n�d�, www�navy�gov�au/�
 26� John Wellfare, “Beersheba’s Battle Plan,” Army 
News, February 2, 2012, p� 18�
 27� “Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD),” Royal Aus-
tralian Navy, n�d�, www�navy�gov�au/�
 28� “Developing the Australian Amphibious 
Force,” Australian Army, n�d�, www�army�gov 
�au/�
NWC_Spring2017Review.indb   132 2/22/17   9:32 AM
 PAG E T  1 3 3
 29� “Exercise Demonstrates ADF’s New Am-
phibious Capability,” Australian Government 
Department of Defence, October 6, 2015, 
news�defence�gov�au/�
 30� Gleiman and Dean, Beyond 2017, pp� 28–30�
 31� Terence Dunne [Col�, USMC], interview by 
author, February 16, 2015�
 32� Commonwealth of Australia, 2016 Defence 
White Paper, p� 124�
 33� Stuart Smith [Maj� Gen�, ADF], interview by 
author, October 9, 2014�
 34� Ibid�
 35� Mark Worsfold [Capt�, RNZN], “Why the 
NZDF Needs to Maintain a Credible Naval 
Combat Force,” Navy Today, no� 192 (Septem-
ber 2015), p� 13�
 36� New Zealand Government, Defence Capabil-
ity Plan (Wellington: Ministry of Defence and 
NZDF, 2011)�
 37� NZDF, Future 35, p� 6�
 38� NZDF, 2013 Executive Overview of the New 
Zealand Defence Force (Wellington, N�Z�: 
2013), p� 7�
 39� Ibid�, p� 8�
 40� Andrew Law [Cdr�, NZDF], interview by 
author, March 3, 2015�
 41� Shane Cowlishaw, “Remedial Work for Navy’s 
Problem Ship,” Dominion Post, February 10, 
2012�
 42� “NZDF Amphibious Landings in Marlbor-
ough,” NZDF, November 13, 2015, nzdf�mil 
�nz/�
 43� “HMNZS Canterbury—L421,” Royal New 
Zealand Navy, n�d�, navy�mil�nz/�
 44� New Zealand Government, Defence Capabil-
ity Plan, p� 24�
 45� After Canterbury was introduced, the ship 
encountered problems in refueling from En-
deavour� “HMNZS Endeavour—A11,” Royal 
New Zealand Navy, n�d�, navy�mil�nz/�
 46� “HMNZS Manawanui—A09,” Royal New 
Zealand Navy, n�d�, navy�mil�nz/�
 47� Nick Lee-Frampton, “Interview: Rear Adm� 
Jack Steer,” Defense News, April 20, 2015, 
www�defensenews�com/�
 48� The JOINT WAKA exercises are designed to 
enhance the NZDF’s “ability to deal with any 
contingencies including humanitarian crisis, 
natural disasters, and regional instability” 
and have involved beach landings and assault 
training� “Exercise Joint Waka Puts NZDF to 
the Test,” NZDF, February 18, 2016, nzdf�mil 
�nz/�
 49� Kathryn Hill [Lt� Cdr�, NZDF], interview by 
author, March 3, 2015�
 50� Law interview�
 51� John Campbell [Cdre�, NZDF], interview by 
author, March 11, 2015�
 52� Rhys Crawley, “Marching to the Beat of an 
Imperial Drum: Contextualising Australia’s 
Military Effort during the First World War,” 
Australian Historical Studies 46, no� 1 (2015), 
p� 68�
 53� For more on Australian amphibious opera-
tions, see Peter Dean, “To the Jungle Shore: 
Australia and Amphibious Warfare in the 
South West Pacific Area, 1942–1945,” Global 
War Studies 11, no� 2 (2014), pp� 64–94; Peter 
Dean, ed�, Australia 1943: The Liberation of 
New Guinea (Melbourne, Austral�: Cam-
bridge Univ� Press, 2014); and Peter Dean, 
ed�, Australia 1944–45: Victory in the Pacific 
(Melbourne, Austral�: Cambridge Univ� Press, 
2016)�
 54� For more on New Zealand amphibious opera-
tions, see Reg Newell, Operation Goodtime 
and the Battle of the Treasury Islands, 1943: 
The World War II Invasion by United States 
and New Zealand Forces (Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland, 2012); Reg Newell, Pacific Star: 
3NZ Division in the South Pacific in World 
War II (Auckland, N�Z�: Exisle, 2015); and 
Reg Newell, The Battle for Vella Lavella: The 
Allied Recapture of Solomon Islands Territory, 
August 15–September 9, 1943 (Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland, 2016)�
 55� Robert Ayson, “Force and Statecraft: Strategic 
Objectives and Relationships in New Zea-
land’s 2010 Defence White Paper,” Security 
Challenges 7, no� 1 (Autumn 2011), p� 17�
 56� Paul Sinclair, “After the Missions: Under-
standing New Zealand’s Security Future” 
(paper prepared for the “After the Missions” 
seminar, hosted by the Centre for Strategic 
Studies and NZIIA, 2013), p� 2, available 
at www�victoria�ac�nz/; Paul Sinclair, The 
Anzac Defence Relationship: Maintaining 
the Momentum, CSS Strategic Background 
NWC_Spring2017Review.indb   133 2/22/17   9:32 AM
 1 3 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Paper 05/2013 ([Wellington, N�Z�]: Centre for 
Strategic Studies, 2013), p� 2, www�victoria 
�ac�nz/�
 57� Peter J� Dean, “Amphibious Operations and 
the Evolution of Australian Defense Policy,” 
Naval War College Review 67, no� 4 (Autumn 
2014), p� 29�
 58� Russell Parkin, A Capability of First Resort: 
Amphibious Operations and Australian 
Defence Policy 1901–2001, Working Paper 
117 (Canberra, ACT: Land Warfare Studies 
Centre, 2002), p� 1�
 59� David Stevens, “The Combined Naval Role 
in East Timor,” in You Cannot Surge Trust: 
Combined Naval Operations of the Royal Aus-
tralian Navy, Canadian Navy, Royal Navy, and 
United States Navy, 1991–2003, ed� Gary Weir 
and Sandra Doyle (Washington, DC: Naval 
History and Heritage Command, 2013),  
p� 108�
 60� Sinclair, “After the Missions,” p� 1�
 61� Centre for Strategic Studies, “Strategic and 
Military Lessons from East Timor,” CSS Stra-
tegic Briefing Papers 2, pt� 1 (February 2000), 
p� 2, www�victoria�ac�nz/�
 62� Stevens, “The Combined Naval Role in East 
Timor,” p� 125; Ian McGibbon, “The Defence 
Dimension,” in Southeast Asia and New 
Zealand: A History of Regional and Bilateral 
Relations, ed� Anthony L� Smith (Wellington, 
N�Z�: Victoria Univ� Press, 2005), p� 28�
 63� “HMNZS Canterbury’s Deployment to East 
Timor: A View from the Commanding Of-
ficer,” National Museum of the Royal New 
Zealand Navy, n�d�, navymuseum�co�nz/�
 64� David Stevens, Strength through Diversity: The 
Combined Naval Role in Operation Stabilise 
(Canberra, ACT: Sea Power Centre–Australia, 
2007), p� 10�
 65� Robert Ayson, “Australia–New Zealand,” in 
Australia as an Asia-Pacific Regional Power: 
Friendships in Flux?, ed� Brendan Taylor 
(Abingdon, U�K�: Routledge, 2007), p� 135�
 66� Julie Bishop [MP] and Marise Payne [Sen�], 
“Australian Support to Fiji Expands,” [Austra-
lian] Minister for Foreign Affairs, February 27, 
2016, foreignminister�gov�au/�
 67� Robert Farley, “HMAS Canberra to the Res-
cue in Fiji,” The Diplomat, February 29, 2016, 
thediplomat�com/�
 68� Bishop and Payne, “Australian Support to Fiji 
Expands�”
 69� Kristin Gardiner, “Op Fiji Assist 2016 Begins 
Major Amphibious Move,” Navy Daily, March 
4, 2016, news�navy�gov�au/�
 70� “NZDF’s Humanitarian Aid Operation in Fiji 
in Full Swing,” NZDF, March 3, 2016, nzdf 
�mil�nz/�
 71� “Fiji Mission One of NZDF’s Largest Peace-
time Deployments to Pacific,” NZDF, Febru-
ary 29, 2016, nzdf�mil�nz/�
 72� “NZDF’s Humanitarian Aid Operation in Fiji 
in Full Swing�”
 73� “NZDF Vessel Brings More Aid and Person-
nel to Cyclone-Hit Fiji,” NZDF, February 28, 
2016, nzdf�mil�nz/�
 74� George Galdorisi and Darren Sutton, “Achiev-
ing the Global Maritime Partnership: Oper-
ational Needs and Realities,” RUSI Defence 
Systems (June 2007), p� 4, available at dspace 
�dsto�defence�gov�au/�
 75� “Minister for Defence—Australia–New Zea-
land Defence Ministers Meeting,” [Australian] 
Minister for Defence, September 17, 2015, 
www�minister�defence�gov�au/�
 76� James Waite, “Contesting ‘the Right of Deci-
sion’: New Zealand, the Commonwealth, and 
the New Look,” Diplomatic History 30, no� 5 
(November 2006), p� 896�
 77� Maren Leed, J� D� McCreary, and George 
Flynn, Advancing U.S.-Australian Combined 
Amphibious Capabilities (Lanham, MD: Row-
man & Littlefield, 2015), pp� vi–vii�
 78� Gleiman and Dean, Beyond 2017, p� 21�
 79� Michael J� Green et al�, The ANZUS Alli-
ance in an Ascending Asia, Centre of Gravity 
Series Paper 23 (Canberra, ACT: Australian 
National Univ�, 2015), p� 12�
 80� Gerald Hensley, “Will New Zealand Ever 
Rejoin ANZUS?,” Policy 19, no� 3 (September 
2003), p� 34; David McCraw, “Change and 
Continuity in Strategic Culture: The Cases 
of Australia and New Zealand,” Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 65, no� 2 (April 
2011), p� 178�
 81� Amy L� Catalinac, “Why New Zealand Took 
Itself out of ANZUS: Observing ‘Opposition 
for Autonomy’ in Asymmetric Alliances,” 
Foreign Policy Analysis 6, no� 3 (2010), p� 319�
NWC_Spring2017Review.indb   134 2/22/17   9:32 AM
 PAG E T  1 3 5
 82� Ian McGibbon, “The US–New Zealand 
Alliance: A Tale of Six Anniversaries,” New 
Zealand International Review 37, no� 4 (July/
August 2012), p� 5; Robert Ayson, “Choosing 
ahead of Time? Australia, New Zealand and 
the US-China Contest in Asia,” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 34, no� 3 (2012), p� 344�
 83� Jack Georgieff, “New Zealand–U�S� Defense 
Relations: A Possible Return to the Alliance?,” 
The Diplomat, June 13, 2013, thediplomat 
�com/�
 84� Ayson, “Choosing ahead of Time?,” p� 347�
 85� Leed, McCreary, and Flynn, Advancing U.S.-
Australian Combined Amphibious Capabili-
ties, pp� 8–9; James Goldrick, “The Future for 
Maritime Forces,” Security Challenges 9, no� 2 
(2013), p� 82�
 86� Chris Niedziocha [Maj�, USMC], “Lessons 
Learned from Down Under,” U�S� Naval Insti-
tute Proceedings 140/2/1,332 (February 2014), 
available at www�usni�org/�
 87� Jim Michaels, “Marines Looking at Deploying 
aboard Foreign Ships,” USA Today, June 21, 
2015, www�usatoday�com/�
 88� Denise Fisher, “Defence White Paper: French 
Pacific Power Ignored,” The Interpreter, May 
21, 2013, www�lowyinstitute�org/�
 89� Denise Fisher, France in the South Pacific: 
Power and Politics (Canberra, ACT: Austra-
lian National Univ� Press, 2013), p� 203�
 90� “Joint Statement of Strategic Partnership 
between Australia and France,” Australian 
Government Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, January 19, 2012, dfat�gov�au/�
 91� Twenty other countries were invited to attend 
the International Observer Program� The 
NZDF, in its inaugural full participation, 
made a significant commitment of 620 per-
sonnel, two ships, twenty-two light armored 
vehicles, and four aircraft (including two 
NH90 helicopters)�
 92� New Zealand Embassy Tokyo, “New Zealand 
and Japan Join Australia-U�S� Exercise,” New 
Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade, n�d�, 
admin�nzembassy�com/�
 93� Franz-Stefan Gady, “Australia and US 
Conclude Major Military Exercise in Pacific 
Region,” The Diplomat, July 28, 2015,  
thediplomat�com/�
 94� Euan Graham, “Talisman Sabre 2015: Bigger 
and More Amphibious,” The Interpreter, July 
20, 2015, www�lowyinstitute�org/�
 95� “Warfighting Exercise to Help NZ Work 
Better with Security Partners,” NZDF, July 12, 
2015, nzdf�mil�nz/�
 96� Gady, “Australia and US Conclude Major 
Military Exercise in Pacific Region�”
 97� Stuart McMillan, “Big Amphibious Exercise 
in NZ,” The Strategist, December 11, 2013, 
www�aspistrategist�org�au/�
 98� “Joint Exercises Key to NZDF’s Future Suc-
cess,” NZDF, November 11, 2013, nzdf�mil 
�nz/�
 99� “Fact Sheet: Exercise Southern Katipo 15,” 
NZDF, n�d�, nzdf�mil�nz/�
 100� “NZDF Amphibious Landings in Marlborough�”
 101� Aren Everett [Mass Communication Special-
ist 2nd Class, USN], “Kearsarge Completes 
Bold Alligator 2014,” America’s Navy, Novem-
ber 12, 2014, www�navy�mil/�
 102� Devan Gowans [Pvt� 1st Class, USMC], 
“U�S�, Coalition Working to Restore Naval 
Character during Dawn Blitz 2015,” Marines, 
September 7, 2015, www�marines�mil/�
 103� “Australian Forces Join Multilateral Exercise 
—RIMPAC 12,” Defence News, July 6, 2012, 
www�defence�gov�au/�
 104� “RIMPAC Ramps Up in Hawaii,” [Australian] 
Army, August 8, 2012, www�army�gov�au/�
 105� Mike Meares [Staff Sgt�, USAF], “Marines, 
Australian Soldiers ‘Splash-In’ for RIMPAC 
2012 Amphibious Training,” Marines, July 18, 
2012, www�marforpac�marines�mil/�
 106� “NZ Defence Force Participation in World’s 
Largest Exercise Gets Underway,” [Royal New 
Zealand] Air Force, n�d�, www�airforce�mil 
�nz/�
 107� “NZ Defence Force Involved in World’s Larg-
est Exercise,” NZDF, May 11, 2012, nzdf�mil 
�nz/�
 108� John Sorensen [Mass Communication Spe-
cialist 2nd Class, USN], “RIMPAC Concludes 
with Enhanced Cooperation among 22 Na-
tions,” Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, July 31, 
2014, www�cpf�navy�mil/�
 109� Department of Defence, “Exercise RIMPAC 
Draws ADF Closer to Amphibious Future,” 
NWC_Spring2017Review.indb   135 2/22/17   9:32 AM
 1 3 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Defence News and Media, August 1, 2014, 
news�defence�gov�au/�
 110� Alesha Gorton [Lt� Cdr�, USN] and Daniel 
Viramontes [Mass Communication Special-
ist 2nd Class, USN], “Australian Amphibious 
Task Group Gets Mission Ready at RIMPAC,” 
July 29, 2014, Navy Daily, news�navy�gov�au/�
 111� “Kiwis Head Home from World’s Largest 
Military Exercise,” NZDF, August 1, 2014, 
nzdf�mil�nz/�
 112� NZDF, The 2013–2014 Annual Report for the 
Year Ended 30 June 2014 (Wellington, N�Z�: 
2014), p� 62�
 113� Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: The 
United States and New Zealand; Forward 
Progress,” The White House, June 20, 2014, 
www�whitehouse�gov/�
 114� Nigel Amphlett [Capt�, RN], “Natural 
Partners and Allies: British-Dutch Defence 
Cooperation,” Atlantische Commissie, n�d�, 
www�atlcom�nl/�
 115� Nigel Amphlett [Capt�, RN], “Life Begins at 
40,” Paul Arkwright (blog), Foreign & Com-
monwealth Office, May 10, 2013, available at 
webarchive�nationalarchives�gov�uk/�
 116� Frank de Grave, “European Security and De-
fence Policy as a Framework for Defence Co-
operation,” RUSI Journal 147, no� 1 (2002), p� 
15; Amphlett, “Natural Partners and Allies�”
 117� Marc Brinkman [Maj�, RNM], “The Dutch 
Contribution to the UKNL Amphibious 
Force: Adapting to Changes in the Global 
Security Situation,” RUSI Defence Systems 
(Summer 2006), p� 70�
 118� “British-Dutch Cooperation between Marine 
Units,” [Netherlands] Ministry of Defence, n�d�, 
www�defensie�nl/�
 119� Julian Lindley-French and Wouter van 
Straten, “Exploiting the Value of Small Na-
vies: The Experience of the Royal Nether-
lands Navy,” RUSI Journal 153, no� 6 (2008),  
p� 76�
 120� “Hennis Names Karel Doorman and Wishes 
Her Safe Passage,” [Netherlands] Ministry of 
Defence, August 3, 2014, www�defensie�nl/�
 121� Geoffrey Till, “Are Small Navies Differ-
ent?,” in Small Navies: Strategy and Policy for 
Small Navies in War and Peace, ed� Michael 
Mulqueen, Deborah Sanders, and Ian Speller 
(Farnham, U�K�: Ashgate, 2014), p� 29�
 122� Michael Quinlan, European Defense Coopera-
tion: Asset or Threat to NATO? (Washington, 
DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2001), pp� 7–8�
 123� Matt Bassford et al�, Strengths and Weaknesses 
of the Netherlands Armed Forces: A Strategic 
Survey (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010),  
p� 52�
 124� Brinkman, “The Dutch Contribution to the 
UKNL Amphibious Force,” p� 70�
 125� Commonwealth of Australia, 2016 Defence 
White Paper, p� 56�
 126� Peter Greener, “Preparing for an Uncertain 
Future: Force Structure Implications of the 
New Zealand Defence White Paper 2010,” 
Security Challenges 7, no� 1 (Autumn 2011),  
p� 33�
 127� Sinclair, “After the Missions,” p� 1�
 128� Tim Wood, “Focusing on Economic Security,” 
New Zealand International Review 40, no� 6 
(November 2015), p� 20�
NWC_Spring2017Review.indb   136 2/22/17   9:32 AM
